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ABSTRACT
A problem of counteracting bargaining powers of retailers, specially in 
agri-food sector, has been recently addressed by regulations in a few 
European countries but so far it has not been subject to academic con-
siderations. A paper aims at finding rationales of granting administrative 
bodies with competences of interfering in contractual relationships be-
tween market players in reference to an abuse or misuse of bargaining 
power and to assess a possibility and probability of balancing public and 
private interests by administrative bodies applying regulations on coun-
teracting an unfair use of a bargaining power. A point of reference for 
considerations is a Polish regulation dated from December 2016 – Act on 
Counteracting the Unfair Use of Contractual Advantage in the Trade in 
Agricultural and Food Products. In a lack of relevant case law a paper is 
based on a descriptive method of research as well as a method of concep-
tual analysis. A paper contests a correctness and rationality of selecting 
a competition authority as an enforcer of a discussed regulation. A com-
petition authority seems to be caught in a trap of opposite (public and 
private) interests - an antitrust authority shall undertake an intervention 
in an interest of a private entity which in many situations may be seen as 
an intervention against public interest. The paper contributes to an on-
going discussion on EU’s proposals for actions on eliminating imbalances 
between big retailing networks and food suppliers.
Keywords: agriculture, bargaining power, competition authority, contractual 
advantage, unfair practices
JEL: K20, L14, L40
1 This article is a revised version of the paper entitled ‘How much private interest in applying admin-
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EGPA conference, Milano, 30 August–1 September 2017. The EGPA contributions are not publicly 
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1 Introduction
Competition policy is crucial for a proper functioning of a free market. Com-
petition law as one of key instruments for enforcing competition policy. This 
area of law is featured with mixed public and private nature - antitrust law is 
considered as public (administrative) law whereas regulations on combating 
unfair practices belong to private (civil) law. Even if such a division of com-
petition law in a broad sense has been well-established for many years in a 
great number of European countries, in recent years a few countries (among 
them Poland) decided to introduce a new type of regulation - the one on 
counteracting unfair use of bargaining power2 that in fact allows an admin-
istrative body (usually competition/antitrust and/or consumer authorities) to 
intervene into contractual relationships between private entities. The core of 
these regulations are conditions and prerequisites of a very civil nature that 
are not enforced, however, by civil courts, but by an administrative body. A 
peculiarity of these regulations lies in a fact that on their basis antitrust au-
thority shall undertake an intervention in an interest of a private entity which 
in many situations may be seen as an intervention against public interest, 
what can be considered as “being trapped”.
This new type of regulations brings a question on a reasonableness of public 
administration’s interventions in individual relationships of entrepreneurs ac-
tive on a market. This paper tries to find rationales of granting administrative 
bodies with competences of interfering in contractual relationships between 
market players in reference to an abuse or misuse of bargaining power. Pro-
viding that administrative authorities should still act only if a public interest is 
concerned, kind of natural is a question upon a necessity and a possibility of 
balancing properly public and private interests in a process of administrative 
proceedings based upon these new regulations. Because a main point of ref-
erence for considerations contained in this paper is a Polish regulation dated 
from 15 December 2016 - Act on Counteracting the Unfair Use of Contractual 
Advantage in the Trade in Agricultural and Food Products3, appointing a na-
tional competition authority (having a status of an administrative body) as 
an enforcer of this regulation, a paper focuses on weaknesses of introducing 
competences for counteracting unfair use of bargaining power by an adminis-
trative body responsible for an enforcement of competition policy.
A paper consists of five sections. The first one presents introductory remarks 
to the topic and thesis laying behind the article. The second section summa-
rizes a methodology. The third section deals with a mixed nature of compe-
tition law, describes main ideas lying behind antitrust law, law against unfair 
competition and a new regulation on unfair use of bargaining power and 
presents rationalities for public interventions in case of antitrust law and a 
2 Bargaining power is an economic rather than legal term, although it is used in the paper in 
order to describe imbalances between suppliers and purchasers that may result in a worse 
contractual position of one party. Other terms used to described this situation (also in this 
paper) are: contractual advantage (used in the official translation of the Polish regulation 
analyzed in this paper) or economic dependence (used e.g. in Portuguese Competition Act).
3 Polish Journal of Laws 2017, item 67. 
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law on unfair use of a bargaining power. The forth section tries to prove that 
granting a competition authority with competences to interfere with contrac-
tual relationships means putting public administration in a trap that can influ-
ence negatively on a social reception of administrative law and functioning of 
public administration. Finally, conclusions based on previous considerations 
are presented.
2 Methods
The paper is based mainly on a descriptive method of research as well as a 
method of conceptual analysis. Because of a lack of relevant case law, the 
analysis focus mainly on legal texts and accompanying acts such as a draft 
proposal of a legal act and its justification and policy papers, with only few 
references to jurisprudence. References to foreign jurisdictions and literature 
are limited because of a very narrow scope of relevant sources containing 
analysis of the topic.
3 Rationality for a Public Intervention By Competition 
Authority: Key Findings
3.1 Public and Private Regulations for Competition
A term “competition law” covers legal regulations aimed at guaranteeing an 
existence of sound and fair competition which is a core of free market econ-
omy. A system of legal regulations dedicated to a protection of competition 
as a market mechanism is commonly established in a majority of European 
countries as a two-fold system consisting of public competition law, known 
as antitrust law, and private competition law, recognized as law against unfair 
competition. Both these areas constitute competition law in a broad sense, 
whereas antitrust law is usually considered as a competition law in a narrow 
sense. A demarcation line between public and private competition law lies in 
an interest protected by each of these regulations: antitrust law is oriented 
for securing competition as a market mechanism whereas private competition 
law aims at protecting an individual entrepreneur from anticompetitive (and 
thus unfair) behaviour of other market participants. Surely these regulations 
are not totally set apart because to a certain degree combating unfair prac-
tices somehow sustains a well-functioning and well-being of competition, but 
still an orientation for varied goals requires a totally different mechanisms, 
tools and institutional framework for enforcement of both types of regula-
tions concerning a protection of competition and thus shaping a competition 
policy.
Antitrust law in Europe (not only in the EU Member States) patterns substan-
tive competition rules concerning competition restricting practices settled in 
Art. 101 and Art. 102 TFEU. The Treaty provisions on restrictive practices are 
applied as long as a prohibited anticompetitive behaviour has an impact on a 
pattern of trade among EU Member States. Art. 101 on a prohibition of anti-
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competitive agreements and Art. 102 on a prohibition of an abuse of a domi-
nant position can be enforced either by the European Commission (acting as 
the EU competition authority) or by national competition authorities (if the 
Treaty rules are applied simultaneously with national antitrust law). Even if 
there is no formal obligation of a harmonization of competition rules, nation-
al substantive competition rules in EU Member States (as well as countries 
in a process of an application for a membership) do not differ from their EU 
prototype, also procedural rules in antitrust proceedings are approximated 
to a high degree. Regarding state aid rules, Art. 107 TEU and its followers 
are applied directly in EU Member States and there are no national rules in 
this area (except for certain technical provision concerning mainly monitoring 
and reporting duties on state aid). Due to such a system of a protection of 
competition throughout EU is pretty concise, based on a (possible) parallel 
application of the EU and national competition rules by public competition 
authorities. EU law does not settle any requirements upon a status of compe-
tition bodies, but in the absolute majority of EU Member States these bodies 
belong to a system of public administration (van de Gronden and de Vries, 
2006, p. 32; Alves et al., 2015, p. 13; Zimmer, 2015, p. 255) and antitrust law 
is considered as a part of administrative law, sometimes also called: admin-
istrative economic law or public economic law). Sanctions for violating pro-
hibitions of anticompetitive practices formally are administrative fines,but 
because of their potential big amount, they are treated as criminal sanctions 
due to standards of Art. 6(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights4 
(Perroud, 2008; Błachnio-Parzych, 2012, p. 35).
Unlike in the US, public enforcement of antitrust law is dominant either in the 
EU or in its Member States, but it is complemented by private enforcement 
of antitrust law. The latter means that violations of antitrust rules (precisely: 
prohibitions of anticompetitive practices) can be sources of damages granted 
by civil courts on an individual demand after conducting a full “traditional” 
court proceeding5. In this dual system of an enforcement of antitrust law, a 
division of tasks is very clear: competition authorities protect public interest 
whereas courts provide measures protecting individual (justified) interests.
The characteristics of antitrust law should be supplemented by a concise, 
somehow juxtaposed, description of private competition law. Antitrust law 
concentrates on prohibiting market practices that can eliminate, distort or 
prevent competition as a necessary mechanism of a free market economy. 
Regulations on combating practices of unfair competition aim at eliminating 
market practices that do not have an impact on a whole market but they de-
teriorate a market position of competitors due to unfair behaviour, defined 
e.g. in Art. 3(1) of the Polish Act on Combating Unfair Competition6 as “an ac-
4 See e.g. a judgment of ECtHR in case A. Menarini Diagnostics srl v. Italy, second section, 27 
September 2011. 
5 Private enforcement of antitrust law was much facilitated by an implementation of Directive 
2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain 
rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition 
law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, OJ L 349, 5.12.2014, p. 1–19.
6 Act of 16 April 1993 on Combating Unfair Competition (consolidated text: Polish Journal of 
Laws 2003, No 153, item 1503, as amended). 
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tion contrary to law and good practices, if it endangers or infringes interests 
of another entrepreneur or client”. Unfair competition practices are, among 
others, constituted by misleading advertising7, unjustified discovering of busi-
ness secrets or counterfeiting products. Only in regard to misleading (and 
comparative) advertising a national law on combating unfair competition im-
plement EU directive, the biggest part of these regulations are just a result 
of domestic decisions (and legal traditions). Regulations on combating un-
fair competition stipulates measures of intervention typical for civil law - e.g. 
claims for repairing a damage, for discontinuation of unfair practice, claims in 
a case of unjustified enrichment (see Art. 18(1) the Polish Act on Combating 
Unfair Competition). Enforcers of these kinds of regulations are civil courts. 
Even if Art. 1 of the relevant Polish Act settles that the Act regulates issues 
of preventing and combating unfair competition “in public interest and in in-
terests of entrepreneurs and clients”, there is no doubt - in the context of the 
whole act - that this is an individual (private) interest that is predominantly 
protected by this regulation.
3.2 Rationality of a Public Intervention on the Basis of Antitrust 
Law (With References to the Polish Act on Competition and 
Consumer Protection, 2007)
A question on why public authorities intervene when competition is prevent-
ed, distorted or eliminated can be responded with a reference to economic 
and legal reasons. The doctrine of free market economy sees a competition 
as a necessary market mechanism, although competition is not an absolute 
value anymore - acceptability of state aid is the best example of this shift. 
What lies behind antitrust law that creates a legal and institutional framework 
for protecting competition is a public interest in preserving competition as 
a natural market force working for a total welfare. Certainly, public interest 
in antitrust law shall not be treated as a good way for a delivery of budget 
incomes from antitrust fines (even if because of a ceiling for fines at a level of 
10% of total turnover or incomes, it is quite tempting) or a great measure to 
protect domestic entrepreneurs (specially national champions) from foreign 
competition or to protect state-owned companies from any external compet-
itors. Public interest cannot be understood in this manner. Because of limited 
resources of competition authorities public interest in protecting competi-
tion as a market mechanism cannot be practically found in every single case 
of a distortion of competition - antitrust authorities have to select cases to 
intervene. Main goals of public bodies’ activities are usually hardcore cartels 
which in fact are the most devastative for competition. Priorities of interven-
tion are announced by antitrust authorities in multiannual programmes of 
competition policy.
7 In this regard the Polish Act on Combating Unfair Competition implements Council Directive 
84/450/EEC of 10 September 1984 relating to the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning misleading advertising (OJ L 250 
, 19.9.1984, p. 17 - 20) and Directive 97/55/EC of European Parliament and of the Council of 
6 October 1997 amending Directive 84/450/EEC concerning misleading advertising so as to 
include comparative advertising (OJ L 290 , 23.10.1997, p. 18 - 23).
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Public interest as a precondition for antitrust intervention exists in an 
enforcement of antitrust law either in direct or indirect manner. According to 
Art. 1(1) of the Polish Act on Competition and Consumer Protection8 it “(...) 
lays down the framework for development and protection of competition, 
and sets out the principles of actions to be undertaken, in the public 
interest, in order to protect the interests of undertakings and consumers”. 
This provision directly mentions public interest as a sort of “metacondition” 
for applying substantive competition rules - if there is no public interest in 
antitrust intervention, the Act should not be applied. In further parts of the 
Competition and Consumer Protection Act a legislator identifies situations 
where a necessity for intervention - assessed from a perspective of a public 
interest - disappears. A lawmaker decided that public interest does not cover 
so called de minimis agreements (agreements of a minor importance) - Art. 7 
of the Polish Competition Act exempts from a prohibition of anticompetitive 
restrictive practices agreements that do not include any hardcore restrictions 
of competition and which are concluded between entrepreneurs whose 
market shares are below certain thresholds9. In case of de minimis agreements a 
competition authority is released from a duty to conduct antitrust proceeding 
(de minimis rule is common in antitrust legislations, it is also applied by the 
European Commission10). A reason for a public intervention also disappears 
when limitation periods (of 5 years) for initiating an antitrust proceeding 
passes (Art. 93 of the Polish Competition Law).
Apart from these unique provisions, the Polish competition authority enjoys 
a very broad competence to shape a meaning of a metacondition of public 
interests, because according to Art. 47 of the Polish Competition Law antitrust 
proceedings are initiated solely on the own motion of a public enforcer, 
applications for starting an antitrust proceeding are not binding. What should 
be highly appreciated is a fact that the Polish competition authority in every 
antitrust decision refers to a prerequisite of public interest and explains in 
what way a particular case meets this condition. But still, if it gets a piece of 
information on a potential violation of law, the competition authority is not in 
any way obliged to provide explanations why a case is beyond public interest. 
An interpretation of a concept (a notion) of public interest has a great impact 
upon a level and intensity of competition on relevant markets. A meaning of 
public interest can be delivered and shaped not only by an antitrust authority 
itself, but also by appealing bodies (in Poland, as in many other legislations: 
courts). A case law reflecting judges’ positions on a public interest is vast. Over 
8 Act of 16 February 2007 on Competition and Consumer Protection (consolidated text: Polish 
Journal of Laws 2017, items 229, 1089, 1132, as amended). 
9 Agreements between entrepreneurs are exempted from a prohibition of anticompetitive 
agreements if market shares of parties to an agreement does not exceed 5% in case of 
horizontal agreements and 10% of vertical agreements. An agreement can benefit from an 
exemption only if it does not contain hardcore restrictions of competition. 
10 Communication from the Commission — Notice on agreements of minor importance which 
do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (De Minimis Notice) (OJ C 291, 30.08.2014).
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more than 25 years of an application of antitrust law in Poland11 courts shifted 
from a quantitative to a qualitative concept of public interest. Treating a public 
interest in a quantitative dimension meant guaranteeing market conditions 
for an operation of as many competitors as possible. Public interest in a 
qualitative sense presumes that competition must be effective from a point 
of view of consumer (total) welfare, regardless a number of competitors (a 
welfare may not necessarily be provided by the highest possible number 
of entrepreneurs active on a market). A settled interpretation of public 
interest as a reason for antitrust intervention by public authorities is concisely 
described in the following statement of the Warsaw Court of Appeals dated 
from 17.12.2010 (VI Aca 427/10): “(...) Preventing a common economic 
damage caused to consumer (or increasing its size) shall be treated as a value 
constituting a public interest. (...) A violation of a interest of any individual is 
even not necessary to apply instruments of intervention regulated in the Act”. 
Indeed, sometimes an activity of a public enforcer brings some benefits to 
individuals (because of a public intervention an entrepreneur whose interest 
was touched by anticompetitive practices does not need to stand up to a 
court with a claim for giving up a prohibited practice).
3.3 Regulations Against Unfair Use of a Contractual Advantage
An economic development resulted in a growing number of chains of hyper- 
and supermarkets and their great buying power in many European countries. 
Big retailing networks became very powerful market players who could have 
abuse their economic positions in relationships with their suppliers, especially 
with SMEs. Undoubtedly, unfair treatment of suppliers happened and these 
practices could not have been caught by Art. 102 TFEU (a prohibition of an 
abuse of a dominant position) or its national counterparts, because retailing 
networks do not have a dominant position on a relevant (European or do-
mestic) market (Stefanelli and Marsden, 2012, p. 3). Therefore the European 
Commission prepared the thorough analysis of a distribution chains of food 
products which showed that some practices of traders should be eliminated 
(DG Internal Market, 2014; OECD, 2014). However, the European Commission 
itself so far has not decided to introduce any binding law (regulations or direc-
tives) against unfair use of a bargaining power of purchasers, but it adopted 
in 2014 the Communication on tackling unfair trading practices (UTPs) in the 
business-to-business food supply chain12 and in 2016 addressed the report on 
unfair business-to-business trading practices in the food supply chain to the 
European Parliament and the Council13. But a debate on EU legal framework 
11 The first antitrust regulation designed for a market economy was adopted in Poland in 
February 1990. 
12 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Tackling unfair trading 
practices in the business-to-business food supply chain, Strasbourg, 15.7.2014, COM(2014) 
472 final. 
13 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on unfair business-
to-business trading practices in the food supply chain, Brussels, 29.1.2016, COM(2016) 32 
final.
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for unfair practices in food retaining is still on, heated up by the European 
Parliament14 and supported by the European Council15.
In a few countries national traders decided to adopt a national code of con-
duct and thus grounds for lawmakers’ intervention disappeared. In other 
countries, indeed, sales networks did not succeed in cooperating so legisla-
tors decided to act. Certainly, there was a problem with abusing a bargain-
ing power by some market players - because of the fact that usually none of 
hyper- or supermarkets chain has a dominant position on a national market, 
practices against suppliers could not have been caught by a prohibition of an 
abuse of a dominant position (which is included in “traditional” antitrust law). 
Despite some minor differences in conditions or sanctions, a philosophy of 
legislator’s intervention remains the same: an administrative body is provided 
with a competence to stop or to amend contracts between individual entre-
preneurs if circumstances show that a bargaining power was unfairly used 
by a chain. An expiry or a change of a contract is not the only measure of an 
intervention, an enforcer is usually in charge to impose a fine on an infringer. 
It must be added here that usually all these abusive, unfair practices were un-
dertaken in relations with food suppliers so regulations are often limited to 
an agricultural and food sector.
Regulations of this kind were adopted e.g. in Poland, Italy, Hungary and Ro-
mania.
3.4 Rationality of a Public Intervention on the Basis of Law 
Against Unfair Use of Bargaining Power (With References 
to the Polish Act on Counteracting the Unfair Use of 
Contractual Advantage in the Trade in Agricultural and 
Food Products, 2016)
Equality of parties in civil law-based relations, guaranteed as one of fundamen-
tal values in civil codes, in reality is strongly modified by market (economic) 
and social conditions. Entities holding a certain level of market power - which 
can result from e.g. a volume of purchase/sales or localization - they enjoy a to-
tal discretion in selecting contractors (from a great number of) and therefore 
they may be tempted to abuse their bargaining power. As pointed above such 
a situation may occur specially in a retail sector, in relations between hyper- 
and supermarkets chains and their suppliers, mainly suppliers of food prod-
ucts. This inequality of market positions and a bargaining advantage of retail 
chains (quite often companies of foreign origins) versus a “handicapped” po-
sition of suppliers (usually domestic companies, farmers or their associations) 
created a promising political (even populist in some cases) potential.
Regulations on combating unfair practices resulting from a bargaining posi-
tion are generally based on a prerequisite of a public interest - an interven-
14 See European Parliament Resolution of 7 June 2016 on unfair trading practices in the food 
supply chain (2015/2065(INI)).
15 Council conclusions of 12 December 2016, Strengthening	farmers’	position	in	the	food	supply	
chain and tackling unfair trading practices.
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tion of an administrative body is initiated if a public interest is somehow dam-
aged. Art. 1 of the Polish Act on Counteracting the Unfair Use of Contractual 
Advantage bears a resemblance to Art. 1 of the Competition and Consumer 
Protection Act claiming that “Act establishes rules and procedures for coun-
teracting, in order to protect public interest, practices that unfairly use a con-
tractual advantage (....)”. Both provisions calls a public interest as a condition 
for an administrative interference, both regulations are enforced by the same 
specialized administrative authority which is the President of Office of Com-
petition and Consumer Protection. But does a public interest mean the same 
in both regulations? A coherence of a legal system and a coherence of a sys-
tem of public administration would require the same interpretation of this 
concept. If a lawmaker grants a competition authority with competences to 
enforce the new regulation on an unfair abuse of a contractual advantage, it 
is reasonable to expect that the idea behind it was an implementation of the 
same goal, i.e. protecting a public interest in the same dimension (as it is clear 
that an interpretation of a public interest can vary depending on the content 
of a certain regulation and its enforcement system). However, a meaning of 
a concept of a public interest - that must be protected by the Polish competi-
tion authority - is totally different in the context of the Competition and Con-
sumer Protection Act (where public interest means protecting competition 
as a mechanism of market economy) and the Act on Counteracting the Unfair 
Use of Contractual Advantage. The latter refers to a public interest but, as it 
can be read in a governmental preface to the draft Act, mainly in a context of 
food safety. In the preface we can read that “the draft proposal aims at elimi-
nating unfair practices from a distribution chain of supplies of agricultural and 
food products. This area of economic activity is linked to a food safety of the 
state so it has also a social dimension”16. Then a government claims that food 
safety is a part of a national safety so it is “significantly important” to prevent 
a negative influence of contractual relations on a food safety of Poland. A 
danger for a food safety is reflected in by a fact that purchasers’ pressure on 
a level of prices imposed by suppliers can result in a limitation of production 
or its absolute abolishment or in a deterioration of a quality of food. Addi-
tionally, the government affirms that because of unfair practices in trading 
agricultural and food products a financial situation of food producers is weak-
ened what results in decreasing food quality and investing resources as well 
as in limiting their innovativeness. What appears as a final justification of an 
administrative intervention into a freedom of contract is a particular interest 
of a particular group: food producers. Even if the Act theoretically refers to 
unfair practices that can be undertaken by both parties - purchasers and sup-
pliers, the justification for the Act tells almost exclusively about unfairness of 
purchasers, identifying them mostly as chains of hyper- or supermarkets, even 
if a distribution chain of food (potential “unfair practitioners”) is much more 
complex17. In the context of a competition authority’s activities public inter-
16 Draft Proposal, p. 1. At: <http://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm8.nsf/druk.xsp?nr=790> (accessed 25 
July 2017).
17 Four organisations of distributors and retailers (Polish Chamber of Commerce, Main Council of 
Associations of Commerce and Services, Polish Organization of Commerce and Distribution, 
Forum of Polish Trade) consider the Act on Counteracting the Unfair Use of Contractual 
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est can be easily associated with consumers’ interest. Astonishingly, consum-
ers were mentioned in a preface to the draft proposal only twice, certainly, 
the regulation is not consumer-oriented at all. The draft proposal did not say 
a word about a possible increase of food prices for consumers as a result of a 
public interference with contractual relationships.
4 Administrative Body Responsible for Counteracting an 
Unfair Use of a Contractual Advantage – In a Trap of 
Contrary Interests
In the Polish case where a competition authority was selected as an enforc-
er of the Act on Counteracting the Unfair Use of Contractual Advantage in 
the Trade in Agricultural and Food Products it needs to be observed that an 
administrative body was caught in a trap of interests (Chauve at al., 2014, p. 
304). And this trap is even double-level.
The first level covers to a contradiction within a sole concept of a public inter-
est on the basis of the Competition and Consumer Protection Act and on the 
grounds of the Act on Counteracting the Unfair Use of Contractual Advan-
tage. In the first case a public interest means protecting competition (mar-
ket rivalry), in the second - a public interest is condensed to a food safety. A 
problem arises when competition authority’s intervention for a sake of a food 
safety is... anticompetitive. Let us imagine that a supermarket chain gave a 
notice on an expiry of a multiannual contract to a producer of apples. A notice 
was given in a total accordance with rules prescribed in a contract, an expiry of 
a contract will be completed in an appropriate period. A reason for finishing a 
cooperation is a lower price of apples offered by a new contractor. A decision 
of a supermarket chain seems rational. This is generally how a competition 
works: if you are offered a cheaper product that you can sell at the same price 
as a product bought at a bigger price or you can sell more products of this 
kind because you can offer a lower price to consumers, you probably go for it. 
It needs to be underlined, however, that in contractual relationships a price 
is not the only factor considered in business decisions. Does the competition 
authority start a proceeding against a supermarket chain from this example 
on the basis of the Act on Counteracting the Unfair Use of Contractual Ad-
vantage? It is highly probable - formal prerequisites for starting such a pro-
ceeding, prescribed in the Act, do allow for it. Does the competition authority 
impose a fine on a supermarket chain? Again, it is highly probable (a fine up to 
3% of a total turnover of an infringer gained in a previous year). Initiating the 
proceeding and adopting a decision will be totally correct in the light of the 
Act on Counteracting the Unfair Use of the Contractual Advantage, but it may 
be considered as a decision stopping a development of competition what in 
fact is contrary to a competition authority’s task in the light of Competition 
and Consumer Protection Act. Isn’t it a real trap leading to a schizophrenia of 
this administrative body? A similar problem can be met in all countries who 
Advantage as “asymmetric”. <http://biznes.onet.pl/wiadomosci/handel/wspolny-glos-handlu-
ustawa-o-nieuczciwych-praktykach-jest-asymetryczna/eg7trc> (accessed 25 July 2017).
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have made competition authorities (instead of e.g. Ministry of Agriculture) 
responsible for an implementation of this aspect of public policy, e.g. Czech 
Republic (P. Frischmann, V. Šmejkal , 2016, p. 227). 
The second dimension of a trap is much connected with considerations pre-
sented in the section III above, a public interest in the Act on Counteracting 
the Unfair Use of Contractual Advantage have only a little in common with 
public interest as a reason for administrative intervention in antitrust cases, 
even if a public interest is expressed literally in Art. 1 of the Act and even if in 
the preface to draft proposal guaranteeing of a food safety is declared as a 
foreground goal. It is even not an public intervention in consumers’ interests. 
The administrative authority intervenes for a sake of private interests. This 
“privatization” of activities of public administration in a process of an enforce-
ment of the Act on Counteracting the Unfair Use of Contractual Advantage 
is indirectly confirmed by a legal definition of an unfair use of a contractual 
advantage. Due to Art. 7(2) of the regulation “Using a contractual advantage 
is unfair if it is contrary to good practices and it endangers a significant inter-
est of the other party or if it infringes such an interest”. In the context of this 
definition a precondition for a competition authority’s intervention is a real or 
potential damage caused to an individual entrepreneur. Here a question aris-
es if the competition authority has to intervene in all situations when private 
interests are violated or - at least - endangered. By an analogy with the Com-
petition and Consumer Protection Act it shall be pointed that a public interest 
mentioned in Art. 1 of the Act is a selection criteria, but does it work in this 
manner in a case of the Act on Counteracting the Unfair Use of Contractual 
Advantage? I profoundly doubt. In antitrust law public interest means protect-
ing a competition in danger, regardless individual damages, whereas on the 
basis of the Act on Counteracting the Unfair Use of Contractual Advantage a 
violation of an individual (particular) interest is a necessary element of a vio-
lation of law, so an entrepreneur whose interests were infringed can reason-
ably expect an intervention of the President of Competition and Consumer 
Protection. This expectation is justified because by introducing a threshold of 
50,000 PLN (ca. 11,900 EUR) of a combined turnover of parties to a contest-
ed contract as an entrance condition for an intervention of an administrative 
organ. Establishing such a threshold in Art. 2 point 1 allows for a presumption 
that in cases where this quantitative condition is met and a practice meets 
qualitative conditions from a definition of an unfair use of a contractual ad-
vantage, the public administration intervenes. It is rather doubtful if a food 
safety - declared as a goal of the regulation - can be endangered by a single 
case of abusing bargaining (contractual) power. The public intervention for a 
sake of public interest would be justified if violations of a prohibition of an un-
fair use of a bargaining power were numerous. But the Act on Counteracting 
the Unfair Use of Contractual Advantage does not contain any condition like 
that for administrative activities. The Act leaves a room for a discretion of the 
competition authority to intervene, however if prerequisites of a prohibition 
are described in such an individualized manner entrepreneurs has all the right 
to expect that they will be supported by public administration, especially if a 
public intervention has a direct and immediate effect on their market posi-
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tion. According to Art. 26(2) of the Act an administrative body is obliged to 
impose a duty on an infringer to discontinue a prohibited practice (what in 
reality means e.g. a continuance of a contractual relationship or a change in a 
contract, regardless a negative business result for one party). On the grounds 
of Art. 27(1) of the Act an infringer can be also obliged to implement commit-
ments defined by the competition authority - if an infringer agrees for impos-
ing the duties (e.g. a change in a contract), it can avoid a decision declaring an 
infringement and it can avoid a fine. No matter what decision (a commitment 
decision or an “infringement decision”) is taken, an individual entrepreneur 
benefits from it. However, the regulation lacks any procedures allowing for 
contesting an administrative body’s decision on a non-initiation of a proceed-
ing so individuals’ demands for a public intervention are prevented. A (poten-
tial) victim of an unfair practice is entitled to make a notice to the competition 
authority in case of a suspicion of an unfair practice (Art. 11(1) and (2)), the 
administrative organ is only obliged to provide information on its respond 
to this notice, in fact to inform if a proceeding is initiated or not (Art. 11(3)). 
Summing up, the administrative body’s discretion within a decision on initiat-
ing (or not) an administrative proceeding seems to be the only mechanism for 
balancing public and private interests in an administrative intervention. Ad-
ministrative discretion seems to be a very weak instrument regarding a fact 
that a public intervention on the basis of the Polish Act on Counteracting the 
Unfair Use of Contractual Advantage goes deeply in a sphere of fundamental 
values such as economic freedom and freedom of contract.
5 Conclusions
By the Polish Act on Counteracting the Unfair Use of Contractual Advantage 
a lawmaker obliged a public administration to interfere with contractual rela-
tions (or even wider: with economic freedom), justifying it by a public interest, 
even if in reality effects of this interference are visible foremostly in an area of 
private legal and economic interests (presumingly, in a scheme: benefits for 
one party, costs for the other), with no significant benefit for a public inter-
est. Administrative body is just granted with competences that are normally 
reserved for civil courts (what in my personal view is worth criticizing).
The analyzed regulation lacks any instruments allowing the administrative 
body for balancing private and public interests in order to assess a necessity 
and effectiveness of public intervention in a particular case. Even if the ad-
ministrative body is not obliged to initiate an administrative proceeding in any 
case, a room for a broad discretion was left here, a definition of a violation of 
a prohibition of an unfair use of contractual advantage, referring to a real or 
potential damage to a particular entrepreneur in fact requires an interven-
tion in very individualized cases. On the other hand there is no mechanism to 
demand an intervention from an administrative body. The lawmaker seems 
to have stopped half-way. Such an approach puts the administrative organ in 
a very difficult situation - interventions in all particular cases probably will be 
not useful from a perspective of protecting public interest (food safety), but a 
lack of intervention in individual cases where qualitative and quantitative con-
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ditions are met will certainly dramatically decrease citizens’ trust in public ad-
ministration (which belongs to fundamental principles of administrative law, 
also according to the Art. 8 of the Polish Code of Administrative Conduct18).
Even if an intervention of a competition authority into contractual relation-
ships of entrepreneurs may be considered as justified, reasons for this inter-
vention are linked to food safety rather than to sustaining and developing 
competition. If so, this is not a competition authority that should be obliged 
to enforce the new Act - it should be done by an organ of public administra-
tion in charge of food and agricultural sector. Otherwise, competition author-
ity seems to face schizophrenia when some of its proceedings are aimed at 
developing competition, whereas the others are oriented for interfering with 
legally-shaped market relationships often stemmed from a sound competi-
tion. This must have a (rather negative) impact upon effectiveness of public 
administration within its task in protecting market mechanisms. A solution of 
this dilemma is to move regulations on a contractual advantage in food sup-
ply chains out of (public) competition law (antitrust law) and transfer it into 
agricultural law - it would guarantee at least a cohesion of a concept of public 
interest in applying a certain branch of administrative law - protecting farm-
ers’ interest on the grounds of agricultural law seems to be much more un-
derstandable than “indirect” protection of these interests in antitrust law19.
The Polish Act on Counteracting the Unfair Use of Contractual Advantage 
proves a growing impact of private interests in a process of making 
administrative law and applying administrative (at least formally) regulations 
by administrative bodies. This is not solely a case of Poland, but also of 
other countries that decided to adopt law on counteracting/combating a 
bargaining power (contractual advantages) in agricultural and food sector. 
Some countries, like Germany20 and Portugal, used to combat an abuse of 
bargaining power (economic dependency) in general, regardless a sector, 
straight on the basis of their antitrust provisions (although enforcement of 
the provisions of German Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen in agri-
food sector so far has not been successful (Künstner, 2015, p. 1093; Łyszczarz, 
2017, p. 141). A specific case is Great Britain (probably the most successful in 
counteracting unfair practices in food sector) that in 2009 - under auspices 
of the Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy - adopted 
Groceries Supply Code of Practice that since 2013 has been implemented by 
a specialized body: Grocery Code Adjudicator. A few countries (e.g. Belgium, 
Finland, the Netherlands), however, did not decide for such an intervention 
- in this countries code of conducts took a place of hard regulations. Self-
regulation may be the best way to avoid a trap of interests, however, the EU 
18 Art. 8 of the Polish Code of Administrative Procedure: “Public administration bodies are 
required to conduct proceedings in such a way as to increase the trust of citizens in the State 
bodies and public awareness and appreciation of the law”.
19 Currently (January 2018), works upon EU-wide legislative framework upon a functioning of 
food supply chains are headed at the European Commission by DG Agriculture (in cooperation 
with DG Comp). 
20 § 20(2) in connection to § 19(2)(5) of Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen.
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debate on unfair practices in food supply chains seems to go in a completely 
opposite direction - a tension for adopting hard law seems to be very strong, 
predominantly from the European Parliament, although a scope and a type of 
regulations are still under discussion the EU level21.
National laws on the basis of which (as in Poland) competition authorities are 
responsible for combating unfair practices in an agri-food sector, acting to 
some extant against a fundamental value that must be protected by compe-
tition authority, surely constitute a “conflictual” administrative law (Napoli-
tano, 2014, p. 357), it also belongs to a “new administrative law” (Cassese, 
2012, p. 603), but is it a proper direction of a development of administrative 
law as such and this particular area of regulation? A problem of imbalanced 
relations between food suppliers and purchasers is of great importance al-
though it surely requires a more strategic approach than adopting a regula-
tion that uses public law instruments to protect individual interest, with no 
future vision on an impact on this regulation upon counteracting a problem 
(food safety) in the bigger scale.
21 On 25 July 2017 the European Commission published “policy options” for tackling unfair 
practices in agri-food sector: Inception Impact Assessment. Initiative to improve the food supply 
chain. Ref. Ares(2017)3735471 - 25.7.2017. <http://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/
initiatives/ares-2017-3735471_en> (accessed 28 July 2017). 
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